Publicación:
PRICE OF ANARCHY IN UNIFORM PARALLEL MACHINES SCHEDULING GAME WITH WEIGHTED COMPLETION TIME AS SOCIAL GOAL

dc.creatorFELIPE TOMÁS MUÑOZ VALDÉS
dc.date2024
dc.date.accessioned2025-01-10T15:47:08Z
dc.date.available2025-01-10T15:47:08Z
dc.date.issued2024
dc.description.abstractTHIS ARTICLE INVESTIGATES THE EFFICIENCY OF NASH EQUILIBRIA IN A UTILITARIAN SCHEDULING GAME, WHERE EACH JOB, ACTING AS AN AGENT, STRATEGICALLY SELECTS A MACHINE FOR ITS PROCESSING. THE STUDY FOCUSES ON A UNIFORM PARALLEL MACHINE ENVIRONMENT, EMPLOYING THE WEIGHTED SHORTEST PROCESSING TIME RULE AS THE LOCAL POLICY AND THE TOTAL WEIGHTED COMPLETION TIME AS THE SOCIAL GOAL. WE ESTABLISH UPPER AND LOWER BOUNDS FOR THE PRICE OF ANARCHY, OFFERING VALUABLE INSIGHTS FOR THIS SCHEDULING GAME.
dc.formatapplication/pdf
dc.identifier.doi10.1051/ro/2024017
dc.identifier.issn2804-7303
dc.identifier.issn1290-3868
dc.identifier.issn0399-0559
dc.identifier.urihttps://repositorio.ubiobio.cl/handle/123456789/13639
dc.languagespa
dc.publisherRAIRO-OPERATIONS RESEARCH
dc.relation.uri10.1051/ro/2024017
dc.rightsPUBLICADA
dc.subjectweighted completion time.
dc.subjectuniform parallel machines
dc.subjectscheduling game
dc.subjectPrice of anarchy
dc.titlePRICE OF ANARCHY IN UNIFORM PARALLEL MACHINES SCHEDULING GAME WITH WEIGHTED COMPLETION TIME AS SOCIAL GOAL
dc.typeARTÍCULO
dspace.entity.typePublication
ubb.EstadoPUBLICADA
ubb.Otra ReparticionDEPARTAMENTO DE INGENIERIA INDUSTRIAL
ubb.SedeCONCEPCIÓN
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